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Most of previous studies concerning the Public Goods Game assume either participation is unconditional
or the number of actual participants in a competitive group changes over time. How the fixed group size,
prescribed by social institutions, affects the evolution of cooperation is still unclear. We propose a model where
individuals with heterogeneous social ties might well engage in differing numbers of Public Goods Games,
yet with each Public Goods Game being constant size during the course of evolution. To do this, we assume
that each focal individual unidirectionally selects a constant number of interaction partners from his immediate
neighbors with probabilities proportional to the degrees or the reputations of these neighbors, corresponding to
degree-based partner selection or reputation-based partner selection, respectively. Because of the stochasticity
the group formation is dynamical. In both selection regimes, monotonical dependence of the stationary density
of cooperators on the group size was found, the former over the whole range but the latter over a restricted
range of the renormalized enhancement factor. Moreover, the reputation-based regime can substantially improve
cooperation. To interpret these differences, the microscopic characteristics of individuals are probed. We later
extend the degree-based partner selection to general cases where focal individuals have preferences towards
their neighbors of varying social ties to form groups. As a comparison, we as well investigate the situation
where individuals locating on the degree regular graphs choose their co-players at random. Our results may give
some insights into better understanding the widespread teamwork and cooperation in the real world.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Hc, 87.23.Kg, 02.50.Le
I. INTRODUCTION
As a most popular game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) has
been widely employed to characterize and elucidate the co-
operation conundrum between individual and group interests
through pairwise interactions [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8]. In many
realistic situations ranging from cellular organisms to hunter
business to national negotiations, however, multiple agents in-
stead of two individuals are usually involved. While many
researchers treated these N-person problems as a summation
of many two-person problems [1, 2, 9, 10, 11, 12], the Public
Goods Game (PGG) was proposed as a representative of built-
in interactions to investigate the multi-person predicament of
cooperation, which can be regarded as a natural extension of
Prisoner’s Dilemma [13, 14, 15]. In a typical example of the
PGG, players belonging to a community of N individuals can
adopt one of the feasible actions, say cooperation (C) and de-
fection (D). A cooperator donates an amount of c investment
to the common pool whereas a defector nothing. The sum
is augmented by an enhancement factor r and then equally
distributed among all players irrespective of their contribu-
tions [13]. In accordance with the name of the PGG, the pa-
rameter r should be constrained to be less than the group size
of the PGG but larger than unit (i.e., 1 < r < N), suggesting
that group of cooperators are better off than group of defectors
whereas defectors outperform cooperators in any given mixed
group [16]. Despite that the group end up maximizing their
payoff if all cooperate, the best strategy for a player is to de-
fect, since every invested unit contribution is discounted as a
∗Electronic address: longwang@pku.edu.cn
return [17]. Thus, the social dilemma of what is best for egois-
tic individual and what is best for the group arises. According
to both classic and evolutionary game theory, cooperators are
doomed under natural selection, which is usually at odds with
the observations in the real world. Considerable efforts have
been expended to find solutions to this plausible paradox.
A variety of measures, such as punishment [18, 19, 20, 21,
22], social diversity and the associated diversity of contribu-
tion [16, 23, 24], optional participation [13, 14, 17] and im-
age score effect [25, 26, 27], have been proposed to answer
the question how large-scale cooperation can evolve and per-
sist stably. In Ref. [23], the authors investigated the influence
of two different patterns of contribution on the cooperators’
evolutionary fate in the context of the PGG whenever indi-
viduals interact along the heterogeneous social ties, and con-
cluded that cooperation can be enhanced if any act of giving
is considered to be cooperative, irrespective of the amount of
giving. It should be noted that in this work individuals play
PGGs with all those directly connected to them, naturally in-
troducing coercion of participation. Different from this as-
sumption, the autarkic ’loner’ was introduced as a third strat-
egy besides cooperation and defection in Refs. [13, 14, 17].
It has shown that this voluntary participation efficiently pre-
vents defectors from spreading within the population through
self-adjusting the group size of the PGG, leading to the ap-
pearance of the cyclic dominance of Rock-Scissor-Paper type.
In most such investigations, nevertheless, the effective group
size varies over time as the frequencies of these three strate-
gies oscillate in the population.
In most ubiquitous observed public goods type interac-
tions [28, 29, 30], however, the group formation is not always
in this way. Due to the restriction of some social norms and,
the fact that each individual has the right to decide whether or
2not to attend an activity [31], the group size can neither be ar-
bitrary number nor be equal to the number of one’s neighbors.
Instead, individuals are usually divided into equal subgroups
to accomplish a public target: of these examples are student
dormitory clean, public transportation and predator inspection
behavior. On the one hand, although large teams, clubs can
function most effectively if their members get well along one
another, some individuals are easily tempted to free-ride on
the public resources without incurring any cost of contribu-
tion [32]. On the other hand, it is difficult to accomplish a
public task if too few persons engage in it [33]. Thus, one may
ask what the invariable group size of the PGG should be, and
how it influences the survivability of cooperators [34, 35, 36].
In this paper we set up a minimal model in which individ-
uals of varying social ties maybe participate different num-
bers of PGGs while the group size of each typical PGG re-
mains constant during the evolutionary process, in line with
most already performed public goods experiments where sam-
ples (usually students) were actually divided into groups con-
taining equal rather than heterogeneous members [34]. The
Baraba´si-Albert scale-free networks are adopted to repre-
sent interpersonal connections, since most natural and artifi-
cial networks share much in common with this type of net-
works [37]. Focal individuals take into account two regimes to
select the group members when playing PGGs: degree-based
and reputation-based partner selections. In the partner selec-
tion based on degree, a focal individual selects his g neighbors
with probabilities concerned with their social ties. For the
convenience of discussion, we divide the enhancement factor
r by the group size g + 1 to be the renormalized enhancement
factor δ. By virtue of numerical simulations, we found that
for small group size, the system transforms from one homo-
geneous state of defectors, after a sharp transition, into the
uniform state of cooperators for increasing δ. For large group
size, the curve of cooperation lever versus the quantity δ sees
a ’gentle slope’, implying that cooperators and defectors can
coexist for a wide spectrum of δ. In the partner selection based
on reputation, a focal individual chooses his co-players among
his neighbors with probabilities associated with their reputa-
tions. Intriguingly, cooperation level as a function of δ mono-
tonically increases almost parallelly as δ increases responding
to different group sizes. Thus, the interplay of group size and
selection regime together orients the evolution and accord-
ingly leading to disparate dynamics of the population. Be-
sides, we extend the degree-based partner selection by equip-
ping focal individuals with biases towards their neighbors of
different social ties. As a comparison, we also perform the
numerical simulation on degree regular graphs.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We make
a brief introduction of our model in Section II. Numerical
results as well as discussions to these accomplished results
are presented in Section III. Concluding remarks are drawn in
Section IV.
II. MODEL
We consider a system with constant population size N. The
pairwise connections are specified via a Baraba´si-Albert net-
work, in which each vertex represents an individual. To con-
struct such a network, we start from a small ring evenly em-
bedded with m0 nodes. At each time step, a newly added node
links to m existing nodes in the instantaneous network follow-
ing the preferential attachment scheme, i.e. , the probability of
an existing node attracting a link is proportional to its current
degree [38]. We repeat this process until N nodes are present
in the network. Initially, half proportion of the population are
randomly assigned to be cooperators (C) and the remaining
defectors (D). Instead of assuming compulsory participation
in the PGG [23], each individual (focal individual) picks out
a fixed number (g) of his neighbors to join in the public en-
terprize according to the specified partner selection regime.
Due to the heterogeneity of connections, different individuals
can potentially involve in diverse numbers of PGGs and, the
diversity in the numbers is closely associated with individu-
als’ social ties or reputations. The payoff of a certain individ-
ual is accumulated over the sum of all the PGGs centered on
his neighbors and himself, respectively. Following common
practice, individual obtaining higher payoff are more likely to
disseminate his strategy. After each round of the game, each
individual i compares his payoff (Pi) with that (P j) of a ran-
domly chosen neighbor j and switches his strategy si to s j
with a probability T (si → s j) = (P j − Pi)/M whenever j fares
better (provided the payoff difference is positive), with M en-
suring the proper normalization and being given by the maxi-
mal possible difference between payoffs of i and j. Otherwise,
he maintains his present strategy.
As for selection regime, two different patterns are consid-
ered here. First, given that individuals of varying numbers of
social ties play distinctly different role in real-world commu-
nities, thus, whenever playing the PGG, a focal individual has
the privilege to determine which neighbors to be picked up.
For a specific PGG centered on individual i, the probability
that each of his neighbors is chosen is given by
Q( j) =
kβj
Σ j∈Ωi k
β
j
(1)
where k j is the number of neighbors of i’s jth neighbor andΩi
the neighborhood set of individual i. Apparently, the exponent
β which we define as the weight of participation, uniquely
measures to which extent this partner selection is related to
degree. In other words, β = 0 represents that all individuals
though with heterogeneous social ties have the same oppor-
tunity to be selected, indicating that focal individuals view
their neighbors indiscriminately. Highly connected individu-
als behave actively whenever β is positive and otherwise cor-
responds to the opposite situation. Individual picks up de-
terministically his most connected neighbor and second most
connected and so on when the parameter β takes the value of
infinity.
Besides, in repeated games, rational individuals can acquire
information of their neighbors’ performance during the past
3moves, which ineluctably has influence upon individual deci-
sion making of either continuing to play with these neighbors
or replace them with alternative ones, if they exist, in the fu-
ture rounds. In order for maximizing one’s own self-interest,
individual tends to team up with his more collaborative neigh-
bors and interact in the Public Goods Game. We, therefore,
conceptualize an individual’s times of cooperation in the his-
tory as his reputation, known to all his neighbors. Explicitly,
Ri(t + 1) = Ri(t) + δt where Ri(t) is individual i’s reputation
at time step t. The function δt takes value of unit if individual
plays cooperation(C) with his partners at time step t and zero
if he defects (for details see [26] and references thereof). To
ameliorate one’s own income, a focal individual is inclined to
enter partnership with those who frequently cooperate, which
means individuals with larger reputations are more likely to
engage in more PGGs. Herein, we assume
S ( j) = R j(t)
Σk∈Ωi Rk(t)
(2)
where S ( j) has the same definition as Q( j) in the formula (1)
aforementioned. Evidently, focal individuals measure the co-
operativeness of their neighbors based on their long-term per-
formance other than decisions on one shot. A neighbor de-
fects once because of errors or other uncertainties, will not
affect his reputation greatly if he immediately retrieves co-
operation in next rounds. But if he frequently defect, focal
individual would regard him to be a bad one. Or rather, in-
dividuals who defect once should not impose great influence
upon themselves but these sticking to defection would cer-
tainly suffer from being excluded.
To decouple the effect imposed by the heterogenous social
ties of individuals situated on the Baraba´si-Albert network
from the effect arising from selection regime, we also carried
on our simulation on degree regular graphs, creating from a
ring with the nearest- and next-nearest neighbors [40]. To
make a clear comparison, the two types of homogeneous and
inhomogeneous networks have equivalent average connectiv-
ity.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In our simulations, a population of N individuals is con-
sidered and a Baraba´si-Albert network is generated to specify
the connections between them, along which interactions can
occur. Initially, equal percentage of cooperators and defectors
are randomly distributed among these N nodes. Individuals
spread their strategies under replicate dynamics, meaning that
the more fit individuals are more likely to subsist and pro-
liferate their strategies within the population. In view that
both individual’s social ties and reputation can affect one’s
social popularity, focal individual tends to select his partners
according to one of the two features of his neighbors in our
model. The synchronous update is adopted for strategy evo-
lution. We shall investigate how these two different selection
regimes separately affect the evolutionary fate of cooperators
when varying the interacting group size of the Public Goods
Game.
Let us first consider the situation of the weight of partic-
ipation, β, being zero, wherein each individual is picked up
equiprobably when playing PGGs, independent of whatever
their social ties are. The fraction of cooperators who survive at
equilibrium state is used to measure the evolution of coopera-
tion. We plot the fraction of these cooperators as a function of
the renormalized enhancement factor δ in Fig. 1. Obviously,
as the PGG group size contracts, the threshold (δthreshold) re-
quired above which defectors are unable to wipe out cooper-
ators anymore appreciates. For a given δ(< 0.87), increasing
the group size leads to an enhancement of cooperation level.
The monotonical dependence becomes vague whenever δ ap-
proaches approximately unit, but cooperation level (≥ 0.75)
has been high with respect to the mean value (0.5). As a
whole, we can say that large group size readily contributes
to the emergence of cooperation in comparison to small ones
if it is invariable during the course of evolution. Intuitively,
the rationale behind this phenomenon is that increasing group
size offers the cooperative individuals with more opportuni-
ties to meet more cooperators, thus leading to the formation
of cooperative clusters, which can resist replacement of defec-
tors successfully. Consider a cooperator surrounded by three
defector and two cooperator neighbors. His expected payoff
would be 1.4δ−1 if g = 1 and 1.8δ−1 if g = 2. Similarly, de-
fectors can also increase their payoff through exploiting more
cooperators per generation as cooperators do for larger group.
The benefit resulting from the aggrandized group acts on co-
operators and defectors’ viability at different rates, the former
stronger than the latter, thereby lower quantity of δ can pref-
erentially select cooperators over defectors, as can be seen in
Fig. 1. Interestingly, disparities were found between our find-
ings and the results reported in Ref. [23], in both scenarios
with focal individual contributing a fixed amount, c, to each
PGG but different numbers of possible PGGs he engages in.
In our model, the diversity in the group size vanishes. Thus,
the heterogeneity in the numbers of the PGGs each individ-
ual participates is annealed as compared to the situation of
compulsory participation. Notably, this coercion in individ-
ual’s playing games results in the interactions of individuals
as diverse as the population connections. The diversity of fit-
ness deduced from both types of above diversity shrinks in
our model, leading essentially to that cooperation level as a
function of δ observes a mild slope compared with results in
Ref. [23] for identical conditions with exception of whether
or not participation is obligatory. It is noting that the PGG is
reduced to the Prisoner’s Dilemma for the case of g = 1, in-
dicating focal individual plus one randomly selected neighbor
forms an interacting competed community, the evolutionary
equilibrium of the population switches from a uniform state of
defectors, after a sharp jump corresponding to a coexistence
state between defectors and cooperators, into a homogeneous
state of cooperators as δ increases.
Intriguingly, the monotonous dependence of the coopera-
tive behaviors on the constant group size turns inconspicuous
when cooperators greatly dominate the population (see Fig.
1). An inspection of the microscopic property of the evo-
lutionary process is indispensable to understand the appear-
ance of the nontrivial cooperation level versus the group size.
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Evolution of cooperation. Fraction of coop-
erators as a function of the renormalized enhancement factor δ, for
different group sizes. Denoting the group size by g + 1. Population
structure is characterized by heterogeneous graph of N = 500 nodes.
We construct the graph following the growth and preference attach-
ment mechanism. Two associated parameters are m0 = 4 and m = 4.
Each data point is averaged over 100 runs, with 10 independent ini-
tial strategy distributions in each run.
Fig. 2 shows the cooperator distribution among individuals
with different social ties in the population. For δ → δthrehold
responding to lower cooperation level, the frequency of co-
operative strategies declines from high-degree individuals to
medium-degree to low-degree ones, consistent with claims
made in most previous relevant works [23, 39]. This posi-
tive correlation is still existent for medium-value of δ wherein
cooperators and defectors are roughly equally distributed, but
grows not so apparent. It is not, however, the same case when-
ever cooperators dominate defectors whereas unable to ho-
mogenize the whole population. The social dilemma in the
PGG is as strong as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma for small δ.
In this settings can cooperators withstand the exploitation of
defectors by forming the cluster of compact uniform cooper-
ative community, robust against invasion of egoists through
mutual breeding. As δ rises, the dilemma is gradually light-
ened. The relaxation is especially evident for δ approximating
1. Our results approbate this prediction (see Fig. 2). The de-
cisive role hubs play in navigating the evolutionary direction
is weakened as opposed to the medium and low-value of δ,
and consequently some hubs switch between cooperation and
defection from time to time (see the upper panel in Fig. 2).
Unavoidably, rational individuals have capability of mem-
orizing the past performance of their neighbors if the game
is repeatedly played. In what follows, we consider another
type of selection regime, i.e., reputation-based partner selec-
tion. In this regime, focal individuals decide which neighbors
to interact with based on the reputations of these neighbors.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the associated results. To reach the same
nonzero cooperation level, the larger group size, the lower δ is
needed. Interestingly, during the transient phases, cooperation
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of de-
gree. For a fixed network, each data point is averaged over 300 runs
with independent initial strategy distributions. Each run progresses
a time of 5000 rounds as transition, and a time window of the next
1000 rounds is intercepted to collect data. A typical value of g is set
to be 4. Cooperation level is 0.27, 0.51, 0.76 from the upper panel to
the below one, respectively.
level almost parallelly increases with respect to δ for varying
g, greatly different from in the case where each individual is
selected with equal probability. In the degree-based partner
selection, once the social heterogeneous graph describing the
population structure is constructed, it would always be static.
As a result of the selection just pertaining to individual’s so-
cial ties, the number of the PGGs each takes part in is un-
changed from the perspective of statistics, independent of how
often it cooperated in the past. Conversely, a focal individ-
ual would alienate his such neighbors with lower reputations
by depressing the pick probabilities assigned to them, on the
condition he can get access to the local information bearing
on the history experience of his neighbors. Individual should
be cautious to make his strategy, therefore. For convenience
of simulation tractability, each individual was equally initial-
ized with a decimal reputation. If an individual frequently
free-rides on the public goods, his reputation progressively
becomes compromised relative to mostly cooperative individ-
uals. Apparently, an individual with a low reputation would
be ostracized by the communities centered on his neighbors,
with an extreme case that an individual of always defecting
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the pa-
rameter δ. Focal individuals each select their group members based
on the reputation of their neighbors. Population structure adopted is
similar to that in Fig. 1. We have collected the data points as in Fig.
1.
interpolating in a sea of cooperators is destined to die since
no individuals are willing to play with him if other alternative
neighbors can be found. Herein, this can be thought as a pos-
itive feedback correlated the associated members in a group
with their reputations. Defectors disrepute themselves as time
goes, inducing the repulsion of their neighbors to continue to
team with them, which in turn becomes a controlling factor
for defectors to be in many PGGs and naturally reduces the
opportunities for them to exploit more cooperators. But for
cooperators, the inverse holds: focal individuals use the coop-
erativeness of these cooperators as a choice criterion can help
maintain these cooperators a good standing, and thus will at-
tract more neighbors to choose them in future rounds. The
exclusion of defectors by their neighbors and the positive as-
sortment among cooperative individuals together brings that
configuration fraught with defectors is deteriorating, and will
be relegated to cooperate, whereas the ones full of coopera-
tors will reinforce themselves and strengthen their resistance
against intrusion of defectors. Thus, impressively lower δ can
induce the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. This
reinforcement especially prevents the vacillation of some hubs
between cooperation and cooperation as appeared in degree-
based partner selection (see Fig. 2 and Fig. 4). Defectors are
unable to invade the evolving formed cooperative associates
once fully established as the reciprocal altruism of the assort-
ment operates.
We next extend the degree-based partner selection regime
to more generous cases by setting the weight of participation,
β, to be a series of discrete values (i.e., β = −1, 0, 1,∞). Here
β = ∞ means that a focal individual chooses his most-large
and next-most-large neighbors as protagonists if g = 2, and
the like. Results were illustrated in Fig. 5. One can find large
β favors cooperation for constant group size. This observa-
tion can be attributed to the effect of the parameter, β, on the
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Reputation of individuals as a function of
degree at stationary state. A focal individual selects his g co-players
among his neighbors based on their reputations. Similar method is
adopted to collect data as in Fig. 2. The parameter g is also set to be
4.
heterogeneous numbers of the PGGs each individual partici-
pates. Although, the diversity of connections per individual
are unchangeable as we adopted a static network of contacts,
our assumption of constant group size makes the heterogene-
ity of network not exactly coincide with that of the numbers of
the PGGs each individual actually engages in. Depending on
the values of β, the deviation can be either intensified or weak-
ened. Condition β < 0 indicates individuals are preferential to
interact with low-degree ones among their neighbors, which
favors unsociable individuals to involve more games while op-
poses gregarious individuals, who are surrounded with packed
neighbors, to experience fewer interactions. On the contrary,
value of β above zero strengthens the positive correlation be-
tween the number of neighbors and the total groups includ-
ing him, that is, individuals with high-degree and low-degree
participate more and fewer PGGs, respectively. The hetero-
geneity of actual interactions of individuals is partly subject
to change of the parameter β and the larger the stronger. Thus,
large β favors the emergence of cooperation. Moreover, the
monotonical dependence of degree of cooperation on δ is quite
clear for β taking value of the inverse of unit, and ebbs as β
goes to infinity. This is intuitively straightforward to under-
stand because discrepancy of the two heterogeneity peaks at
β = −1 (among all the explored cases) and wanes for increas-
ing β. A careful comparison shows that in the degree-based
partner selection, the number of the PGGs each individual par-
ticipates is statistically invariable no matter how his strategy
evolves. Unlikely, in another studied selection, one cannot
expect how many groups involve a given individual as the de-
cisive role of topology playing in participation is weakened.
This hinges in part on the different dynamics of the two selec-
tion regimes.
The inherent complexity of games on the scale free graphs
makes analytical investigations almost impossible. But, a
rough calculation has revealed a conclusion on regular graph,
6which is indeed present but not easily found on scale free
graph. Without loss of generality, let us consider the sim-
plest case for regular graphs with degree k. Assume that, for
the equilibrium local configuration, there have kC(k′C) cooper-
ators and kD(k′D) defectors around a C(D). Because of the up-
dating rule (local competition between nearest neighbors) we
used, a cooperator on average has more cooperator neighbors
than a defector. Namely, the assortment between cooperators
is induced. Hence, we have kC = k
′
C + △k with △k > 0. In
addition, we have the same renormalized enhancement factor
δ for different group sizes.
For group size g = 2, the expected average payoff of a co-
operator and a defector is given by
¯fC = δkCk + δ − 1
¯fD = δ
k′C
k
Thus the payoff difference for g = 2 is △ f2 = f C − f D =
δ△kk + δ − 1. Analogously, for g = 3, the expected payoff of a
cooperator and a defector can be expressed as
¯fC = δ
(
2kCkD
k(k − 1) +
2kC(kC − 1)
k(k − 1)
)
+ δ − 1
¯fD = δ
k
′
Cd
′
D
k +
2k′C(k
′
C − 1)
k(k − 1)

Thus the payoff difference for g = 3 is △ f3 = f C − f D =
δ 2△kk + δ − 1. Obviously, we have △ f3 > △ f2. This means
that larger group size increases the payoff of cooperators more
than that of defectors. As a result, larger group size requires
a lower critical δ for the emergence of cooperation, a well
consistent analytical prediction for the simulation experiments
(see Fig. 6). Moreover, this effect exists in any type of net-
work no matter how heterogeneous it is [10].
Taking together, although the physical networks used to
specify the population structure are independent of evolution-
ary courses, the actual game interactions of focal individuals
can be adjusted over time in our minimalist model, thus lead-
ing to that the interaction graph for a given individual does
not overlap with the learning graph being in concord with the
population structure. In Ref. [41], the authors have explored
the evolutionary dynamics on graphs with breaking the coin-
cidence of the interaction graph and the replacement graph.
The approach of generating the two subgraphs in our model
is somewhat different from that in Ref. [41], where difference
of the two graphs can be exactly adjusted by tuning a model
parameter. In present work, as long as the parameter β takes
finite value in the degree-based partner selection, focal indi-
viduals each can encounter his g neighbors probabilistically in
each round. This dynamical constitution of interacting group
makes this deviation to be dynamically changed and impossi-
ble to be precisely predicted. Then our model can fall some-
where between games on static graphs and coevolution of in-
dividual strategy and neighborhood [6, 42, 43] in the sense
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the pa-
rameter, δ, with different values of the participation weight, β. Lines
with squares, diamonds, triangles, circles correspond to the values of
β being -1, 0, 1, ∞. Population structure adopted is similar to that in
Fig. 1. We have collected the data points as in Fig. 1.
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Fraction of cooperators as a function of the
parameter, δ, with different group sizes, g + 1. Population structure
is specified by a degree-regular graph, in which each vertex has four
neighbors. Focal individuals choose their remaining group members
due to the degree-based partner selection as in Fig. 1. Each data
point is averaged over 300 runs with independent initial strategy dis-
tributions.
that individuals not only update their strategies but also dy-
namically choose group members from their neighborhood.
Noting that focal individuals propose to enter collective ac-
tions and have choosiness towards their neighbors of differ-
ent characteristics. This is clearly an unidirectional selection
but simpler than that in Ref. [32] investigated experimentally.
The case of random selection (i.e., β = 0) eliminates the pref-
erences of focal individuals towards neighbors, but imposes a
great influence on the evolution of cooperative behavior just
7similar to a gradual but long lasting process of erosion by wa-
ter to the formation of deep valleys. Extension of the random
selection (i.e., non-zero values of β) closely reflects such real-
life situations where individuals have different preferences to-
wards individuals with diverse social ties.
In the case of participation being compulsory, an increase
in the average group size is detrimental to the survival of co-
operation, holding for both two investment schemes adopted
(see [23] for details). Conversely, our findings show that in-
crease in the average group size (i.e., g + 1) is beneficial to
the buildup of cooperation on heterogeneous structured popu-
lation. In Ref. [23], increase of the average connectivity leads
to increase in the connectedness of the graph, a disadvanta-
geous feature against the establishment of cooperation. In our
model, since we have fixed the average degree of the graph,
the heterogeneity of the population is unchanged. Besides, we
have normalized the enhancement factor r divided by g + 1 as
δ, the overall scaling of the value of r deduced from increase
in group size is automatically incorporated. Remaining differ-
ences between curves (see Fig. 1) should be attributed to other
factors. For small fixed group size, any individual can choose
g group members from his more than g neighbors. This flex-
ibility of selection, which softens up the heterogeneity of ac-
tual interacting network, is lessened as g increases. Of an ex-
treme g being set to be 4, individuals accounting for a large
proportion of the population have no alternative neighbors but
to confront all their neighbors, meaning that the heterogene-
ity of interacting network is much closer than that of cases of
small gs, to the heterogeneity of the scale free graph defining
the population structure. This can explain the rough monoton-
ical dependence of cooperation level on the group size g + 1.
Similarly, when we alter the participation weight, β, increase
of it also plays a striking positive role in shrinking the diver-
gence of the actual interacting network from the population
structure. Thus, for constant group size, cooperation is con-
venient to emerge and be maintained for large βs, consistent
with simulation results (see Fig. 5).
In contrast with degree-based partner selection, the pop-
ulation structure is no longer an overriding determinant on
who-meets-whom even statistically in reputation-based selec-
tion regime. Focal individuals can unidirectionally [32] ad-
just their preferences towards their neighbors after each round
according to their reputations, tantamount to a type of ’soft’
punishment where no cost is involved with punishers and the
punished. Focal individuals potentially exert punishment on
their neighbors of ill repute [44, 45] by excluding them in the
future collective behaviors without damaging their own rep-
utations [45]. Thus only those continuously upholding good
reputations will not suffer from being excluded and herein ac-
quire more opportunities of help and being helped (i.e., di-
rect reciprocity). This selection regime in effect avoids ’the
second-order free-rider problem’ because punishers withdraw
interactions with the punished at no cost to themselves. Thus,
cooperation should emerge for substantially small δ analogous
to degree-based regime, confirmed by the simulation results
(see Fig. 1 and Fig. 3). We finally point out that in both selec-
tion regimes, irrespective of the social ties or reputations, no
individual can be absolutely banished in that each individual
would participate at least one PGG centered on himself.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a model to study the effect of the con-
stant group size on the evolution of cooperation. The inter-
actions of individuals was metaphorized by the Public Goods
Game. Two selection regimes were introduced for a centered
individual to pick up a fixed number of players from his neigh-
bors, according to their degrees or reputations, which we refer
to as partner selection based on degree or partner selection
based on reputation. The centered individual adding these
chosen neighbors constitutes an interacting group and plays
the PGG. Whenever individuals interact without memory ef-
fect (only considering the social viscosity of neighbors), on
the one hand large group improves the payoff of both coop-
erators and defectors, but the former at a larger rate; on the
other hand, large group strengthens the heterogeneity of the
actual interactions. These two considerations together leads to
that large groups favor cooperation more than small ones. In
extended cases we found increase of the participation weight
plays a principal role in promoting cooperation for a given
group size. Later, we investigate how cooperation evolves un-
der the reputation-based selection regime. The positive cor-
relation between individual’s reputation and the number of
the PGGs per individual forms a positive feedback, which
enables centered individuals to reply promptly to frequently
defective neighbors. As a consequence, cooperation can be
induced to a higher level than in the partner selection based
on degree, where individual is inept to displace the members
in the community centered on it from the viewpoint of statis-
tics. Besides, we scrutinize the microscopic characteristics to
find that, when the selection is progressing based on reputa-
tion, the hubs ’loyally’ play a leading role in enhancing and
stabilizing cooperation in the whole range of the renormalized
enhancement factor δ, which is shortened in the degree-based
selection regime, offering a better interpretation to the aggre-
gate observations. We also mathematically prove that expan-
sion in the group benefits cooperators more than defectors in
a homogeneous population, and this effect can be generalized
to any type of network, particularly scale free network. Het-
erogeneity of the PGGs per individual combining the partner
selection regime together leads to rich dynamics on heteroge-
neous population.
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